Yes please , James. Your father is always worth reading, or at least it seems so to me after looking at that last article of his you posted.
I'm damned if I know what the right answer is on this one. Bush, I'm quite sure, is gunning for Iraq simply because to do otherwise would draw attention to his failure to catch Bin Laden and, deeper than that, his apparent lack of sparkle on domestic policy. He may have justified it to the world and to himself in other ways, but in the end it's all rationalisation.
On the other hand, if someone takes Saddam out, then it's no skin off my nose if they are doing it for all the wrong reasons - so who cares?
On the other, other hand, there is a great difference between the anti-Iraq efforts of Bush and of Shrub. Bush was, above all else, acting in concert with the wishes of the Arab majority. Saudia, the UAE, Egypt, even Syria all took part and all were very, very concerned for their own safety. The US supplied most of the miitary hardware and the lion's share of the fighting men, but make no mistake, it was the US (and friends) helping the Arab states kick Iraq out of Kuwait..
It didn't just have the grudging permission of Saudi Arabia (and the smaller Arab states), it didn't just use Saudi territory, it was something the US. the UK, the other Western nations and the Saudis (together with their Arab allies) worked out together, and actively, willingly participated in. There were Saudi and Yemeni and Egyptian and Kuwaiti and Bahreini soldiers fighting side by side with the US Marines; there were Saudi F-15s and Tornados and AWACS aircraft sharing the sky with the USAF, the RAF and the Armée de l’Air. And it was mostly Saudi and Japanese money that underwrote the entire, incredibly expensive exercise.
I don't think most people appreciate the huge difficulty the Saudis faced in inviting the Western nations to send troops to holy soil, nor the tremendous moral bravery that King Faud showed when he, largely against the clear advice of his subordinates, took the original decision, and then backed it up from time to time in the months that followed. He was risking everything: there was a real and justified fear that the Saudi regime would fall or at least face very serious internal problems because of his policy. In the King's view, that risk was the lesser of two risks: he found himself in the position of having to bet the kingdom, and showed that his family didn't get to be kings in the first place by being afraid of calling the tough ones.
George W Shrub, on the other hand, is more-or-less going it alone. He does not lack the miltary capacity to do this, nor even the financial capacity, but I fear two things about a unilaterial US (and assorted foreign lackeys whose commitment means nothing much other than that they will do whatever Big George asks) commitment.
First: the obvious. It will give crushing power to the argument of those Arabs who say that the US (and its lickspittles) is a very powerful, very selfish, very dangerous threat to the Arab world, and that it is indeed The Evil Empire. If I were Osama bin Laden, and for some reason I did not think that the appalling practices of the Israelis were sufficient to keep a steady flow of desperately commited young men coming into my terrorist training camps for years to come, then I would be hoping and praying that GW Shrub does exactly what he plans to do. To be sure, it will also convince a good few Western-leaning Arabs that the US (and its allies) are committed to helping the causes of peace and democracy, but Bin Laden and his clones do not care how many supporters the US has, only how many enemies. If you are not part of the solution, in Bin Laden's view, then you are part of the problem.
For the Arab world, it is a case of "better the devil you know". No-one likes Saddam. No-one trusts Saddam. But he hasn't actually done any particular harm to them for quite some years now, and the alternatives, post-Saddam, are hoplessly vague and fraught with risk. I'm not sure what the Arabic is for "let sleeping dogs lie", but I bet that it's being said quite a bit just now.
Now, the second concern I have, which is much less obvious. Only in the last decade or so have we seen the US finally turn away from its past practices. First, let us remember, the US was expansionist and nakedly imperialist. Then, particularly in the wake of the Civil War, the US turned isolationist: it was still imperialist, of course, but largely by stealth, by commercial rather than purely military means. The third great phase in US foreign policy began when they themselves felt threatened by outside events. (I'm talking about the two World Wars here, of course.) It began with a mix of fear and altruism and led swiftly to a US posture based on the rhetoric of democracy and the policies of naked greed. The US sponsored and supported countless vicious despots - Saddam Hussein and the Shah of Iran amongst them, of course - and inflicted many grevious blows on smaller countries which had the temerity to stand up to them (consider Chile and Vietnam as but the most conspicuous examples amongst a great many).
Only in the last ten or twenty years - in the post-Vietnam era, really - has this changed. The US gradually began to be a responsible world citizen, gradually stopped supporting most of the worst of its petty puppet tyrants, gradually began to at first consider, and then actively engage in UN efforts to keep peace and further genuine democracy. The Gulf War was but the crowning achievement in a period when the US has genuinely and more-or-less honestly tried to do the right thing a good deal of the time. Old habits die hard, of course, and no-one is saying that the US now acts rightly at all times or does not always have one eye on self-enrichment, but on the whole in the last few years, the foreign military excursions of the USA have been aimed at doing good in the world.
To a considerable extent, I put this down to the success of the Gulf War. Here was a cause with which almost everyone agreed, in which the US could play the unquestioned key role (everyone likes being the star), in which the US strengths (air power and logistics) could be shown in their best light, and which was very, very successful. Not only was Saddam kicked humiliatingly out of Kuwait, his military power was broken beyond hope of recovery, and it was achieved with (on the allied side) a tiny, tiny casualtiy list. On a scale of 1 to 10, this was a 10 out of 10 war.
Best of all, it was paid for by the Saudis. Here was a huge win in both PR and military terms, and someone else was kind enough to bankroll it!
In addition, the US discovered that they could, after all, work with other nations, that even their notoriously arrogant military people were capable of working hand in glove with those of other nations and making a success of it. Flushed with success, the US as a nation discovered that it liked having foreign wars, and even more astonishing, that their new found cooperative skills were such that not a few foreigners actually liked working with them.
Now those who know me well will read my habitual tone of mocking cynicism into these words, and rightly so, but make no mistake, this newfound ability of the US to be a good global citizen is a very, very good thing.
And this, finally, leads me to my second point. What happens after the US (and assorted no-account sidekick nations) bomb Iraq back into the stone age?
Why, nothing much at first. Saddam is gone (no tears to be shed over that) and some other regime takes his place. It might even be a moderately pro-Western regime, though I'd bet London to a pile of bricks that it won't be. What else happens? There is a strong movement towards polarisation in the Arab world. The pro-West leaning ones, of course, will stay discreet and speak in soft voices, as always, and the anti-Western ones will be careful to never give themselves away too much in any one place (i.e., they won't gather in any place that is too easy a target for the laser-guided munitions) but they will be much, much stronger in their belief that the West in general and the US in particular is an evil, viscious regime. Lacking overt power (what good did Saddam's leigons do him?) they will resort to covert means.
Got a pile of old newspapers handy? Flick back and read the one dated September 11th 2001. Read it several times, for you can expect to be seeing it again quite often.
But we are still thinking too narrowly here. What happens when we lift our gaze from the Arab world and look more globally? We see the same sort of things happening all over. Arabs are not the only Muslims in the world, and Muslims are not the only relatively poor people with a grudge or two to hold against the USA. (Anyone remember Bali?)
But it's in the USA itself where the final risk exists. Think about it: vast, vast expense, massive commitment of weaponry and manpower, no doubt some casualties amongst the military men and quite a lot more at home (September 11th style, of course) and all for ... what?
I think it entirely possible that if the US (and it's toadys) do go it alone in Iraq, that there will then be a public backlash once the bils come rolling in. It's easy to be a world-stage hero when your victory is easy, when your opponent is especially evil and stupid (not even Saddam could be that stupid twice running), when everyone rushes to pat your back and say what a great job you did, and when (as most people forget) the Saudi Arabian Government is paying for it all.
So, my second fear is this: that the US, only just arrived in the world as a helpful global citizen these last twenty years or so, will as suddenly depart and treat us to an instant replay of the 1920s idiocy of isolationism, or worse, an instant replay of the 1960s-style diplomacy by Agent Orange.
Should GW go ahead and tackle Saddam? I don't know.
If the United Nations backs it, then yes, I support it. If not, then the risks of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction seem to me to be smaller than the risks of doing something about them.