James
Storage is cool
A letter from my dad to The Economist:
You give too exclusive credit to France for defeating the US-UK in the Security Council. The six 'uncommitted' Council members played a big part by resisting horrendous arm twisting. The substance of the issue also weighed heavily: to most of Iraq’s neighbours and to the wider world, the proposed war always looked a clearer and greater danger to them than did Saddam’s weapons and megalomania. The greatest part of responsibility goes to the US Administration itself. Its aim was clear from the start: regime change, regardless of all other nations’ opinions and interests. Nothing Saddam did would be enough; all proposals for objective benchmarks or for slowing the march to war were rejected. The resolution was a sham, seeking dubious legitimacy for aggression. This was never diplomacy: the only way it could have worked was if the world had submitted to US coercion to join it in a cynical charade.
The main reason most people and most governments on this planet reject US policy on Iraq is not superior morality. It is their alienation from and fear of the Bush Administration. The President's off-putting physiognomy, manner and religiosity could be overlooked if his Administration inspired confidence. Instead its domestic and international agendas appear driven by an extreme simplification and selectivity of issues. Its approach to other nations is contemptuous and bullying. It reviles and destroys the institutions that embody our hopes and ideals, such as the United Nations. Probably most damaging has been the attempt to exclude Americans from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. This is felt as an assertion of superiority over all other nationalities and a demand for immunity from all restraints.
All this is why, for most non-Americans, the issue of the Iraqi cockroach is eclipsed by that of the rogue superpower.
You give too exclusive credit to France for defeating the US-UK in the Security Council. The six 'uncommitted' Council members played a big part by resisting horrendous arm twisting. The substance of the issue also weighed heavily: to most of Iraq’s neighbours and to the wider world, the proposed war always looked a clearer and greater danger to them than did Saddam’s weapons and megalomania. The greatest part of responsibility goes to the US Administration itself. Its aim was clear from the start: regime change, regardless of all other nations’ opinions and interests. Nothing Saddam did would be enough; all proposals for objective benchmarks or for slowing the march to war were rejected. The resolution was a sham, seeking dubious legitimacy for aggression. This was never diplomacy: the only way it could have worked was if the world had submitted to US coercion to join it in a cynical charade.
The main reason most people and most governments on this planet reject US policy on Iraq is not superior morality. It is their alienation from and fear of the Bush Administration. The President's off-putting physiognomy, manner and religiosity could be overlooked if his Administration inspired confidence. Instead its domestic and international agendas appear driven by an extreme simplification and selectivity of issues. Its approach to other nations is contemptuous and bullying. It reviles and destroys the institutions that embody our hopes and ideals, such as the United Nations. Probably most damaging has been the attempt to exclude Americans from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. This is felt as an assertion of superiority over all other nationalities and a demand for immunity from all restraints.
All this is why, for most non-Americans, the issue of the Iraqi cockroach is eclipsed by that of the rogue superpower.